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Abstract
In this comment an economy with exchange institutions is defined as a
special kind of a social system with co-ordination. In such an economy
consumers co-ordinate their trades through the exchange institutions.
It is shown that the theorems of Vind (1983) and Keiding (1985) on the
existence of an equilibrium in a social system with co-ordination have to
be amended. The amended version of these theorems is used to derive an
existence theorem for an economy with exchange institutions.
It is stated that, under certain conditions, equilibria in an economy with
exchange institutions support and only support allocation that are Pareto
efficient and individually rational for the consumers.
This result is used to find out whether the following allocation mecha-
nisms viz. the core, the Walrasian market and the monopoly market can
be supported by exchange institutions. We find that this is not the case Eor
the monopoly market only.
1 Introduction
Social systems were introduced by Debreu (1952). Arrow and Debreu (1954) proved
the existence of equilibríum in a competitive economy by interpreting it as a so-
cial system, or an abstract economy, and then applying an equilibrium existence
theorem for abstract economies.
Vind (1983) added co-ordination to the social system, thus extending the
pos-
sible use of abstract economies to economic models in which co-ordination plays
an important róle. Co-ordination is a natural phenomenon in models in
which
external effects occur. An existence theorem for equilibrium in a social system
with co-ordination was provided. The social system with co-ordination
was used
to prove the existence of an equilibrium in an economy with bilateral exchanges.
In this economy all trade is effected through bilateral exchange institutions which
are co-ordinated by the consumers that are allowed to use them. As Vind noticed
this application has some drawbacks. Some of the equilibria fail to be sustainable
under voluntary exchange.
Vind (1986) pointed out that proving existence of equilibrium in an economy
with bilateral exchanges presents some difficulties if one requires all exchanges,
that
is all the use of the exchange institutions, to be voluntary. In the case of
volun-
tary exchanges it is assumed that no consumer wants to drop (a fraction of) the
exchanges effected through an exchange institution. It was shown that Walrasian
equilibria correspond to voluntary exchange equilibria in a bilateral exchange econ-
omy with money.
The paper of Grodal and Vind (1989) gives an application of a social system
with co-ordination to the field of missing markets. Pre-markets are introduced as
institutions through which exchanges of certain goods can take place. Furthermore
some agents may be able to use a premarket for their exchanges whereas others
may not. A market is defined to be a premarket with a given price vector. Trades
through a market are assumed to be possible only if for every agent using the market
the net trade vector has value zero. This leads to an economy which consists of a
set of consumers and a set of markets.
In this comment we address two questions. Firstly we show that the existence
theorems for equilibrium in a social system with co-ordination of Vind (1983)
and
Keiding (1985) have to be amended. 5econdly we analyse whether an improved
ver-
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sion of Vind's exchange institutions supports the following allocation mechanisms,
viz. the core, the Walrasian market and the monopoly market. We arrive at a
negative answer for the last mechanism only.
The organization of this comment is as follows.
In Section 2 we define an economy with exchange institutions as a social sys-
tem with co-ordination consisting of a set of consumers, who are described by their
preíerence relations and their initial endowments, and a set of exchange institu-
tions. These exchange institutions are defined in a similar way as in Vind (1983).
An exchange institution enables the consumers participating in it to exchange all
commodities with each other and assure that the sum of the net-trades through
it equals zero. The consumers co-ordinate their exchanges through the exchange
institutions. We do not require voluntary exchange, but instead assume volun-
tary participation in the economy with exchange institutions. Thus the notion of
individual rationality in an economy with external effects is captured.
In Theorem 3.1 we amend the existence theorem of Keiding (1985, Theorem 2)
for equilibrium in a social system with co-ordination. Our proof is, essentially,
that of Keiding. We note that this theorem is not, contrary to Keiding's claim,
an extension of the existence theorem of Vind (1983, Theorem 3). Also, we show
that the latter result is incorrect. The error invalidates the proof of Vind's (1983,
Theorem 5) equilibrium existence result for an economy with bilateral exchanges.
Therefore, we use our Theorem 3.1 to derive an equilibrium existence theorem for
an economy with exchange institutions (Theorem 3.2). Our method of proof can
also be used for a correct proof of Theorem 5 of Vind (1983).
In Section 4 we show that if an economy with exchange institutions is connected
and the preferences of the consumers are individualistic, then the equilibria in this
economy support those and only those those Pareto efficient allocations that are
individually rational. We use this eyi~ivalcrni~c res~~lt t~, shciw that cc~re allocatiuns
cau be suppurted as eyuilibria in the ecun~~in,y that has Lhe cualitiuns as its rxchange
institutions. We also show that Walrasian equilibria can be supported as equilibria
in an economy which has the Walrasian market as its sole exchange instit~rti~n.




In the first subsection a definition of a social system with co-ordination is given and
equilibrium is defined. The second subsection is used to define an economy with
exchange institutions and connectedness of such an economy.
2.1 The Social System with Co-ordination
We define a social system with co-ordination and an equilibrium in such a system.
Before giving a formal definition we discuss the notion of co-ordination.
If someone co-ordinates the actions of his subordinates, what happens? First
of all he is assumed to know about the (relevant) actions of his subordinates. One
might assume some course of action is planned by the co-ordinator for each of
his subordinates. If some subordinate deviates from the actions the co-ordinator
planned for him, he may in deviating undertake actions conflicting with the actions
of other subordinates or of the co-ordinator. The combination of his new actions
and the actions of the others might lead to a less preferred situation for the co-
ordinator.
The crucial aspect of co-ordination is that the subordinate is only allowed to
undertake actions different from the planned actions if his co-ordinator agrees to
the change. The co-ordinator, the boss, can be said to have the right to veto any
deviations from the planned actions he co-ordinates. An agent may have more than
one co-ordinator. If a change in the system of actions is proposed every agent takes
into account the changes in his own actions and the changes in the actions of the
agents he co-ordinates.
An equilibrium system of actions is required to be feasible and stable. Stability is
defined to mean that no change in actions can be proposed that leads to anticipated
states that are attainable and not anticihated tu he ve~toed b,y any agent.
This leads to the following formalization.
Definition 2.1 A Social System with Co-ordination is an indexed farrcily
I' :- (X, {~a, Pa, ea~aEA) where:
1. A i~ a finite non-empty eet.
,~. 11' ie a nonempty eet.
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8. ,Oa : X ~ X ia a correapondence. We define p: X~ X by p(x) -
naEnQa(x)-
4. Pa : X~ X ia a correapondence auch that x ~ Pa(x).
5. ea : X x X-1 J2~ i~ a function.
VVe give the social system with co-ordination, I', the following interpretation. The
set A is the set of agents. The set X is the set of actions or states available to
the social system as a whole. As an example we might define the set of states of
the system as X:- ]-jaEq Xa, where Xa is the set of actions available to agent a.
The correspondence pa assignes to each x E X the set ,Qa(x) of states attainable
for agent a starting from state x. The correspondence Pa assigns to each state
x E X the set Pa(x) of states strictly preferred to x by agent a. For the pair of
states (x, y) E X x X we interpret eQ(x, y) as the state anticipated by agent a to
be obtained when instead of state x state y is proposed.
Now that we have defined a social system with co-ordination, we define an
equilibrium in it. We define M: X x X ~ A such that M(x, y) -{a E A ~
ea(x, y) ~ x} and define I: X~ X such that I(x) - {y E X ~ M(x, y) ~ 0}. We
interpret M(x, y) as the set of agents who are informed about a planned change in
state from x to y. The set I(x) is interpreted as the set of states y such that at
least one agent is informed about a change from state x to state y. This means
that a change from state x to some state y E I(x) is not unnoticed.
Definition 2.2 A atate x' E X ia an equilibrium in the aocial ayatem with co-
ordination I' if:
1. x' E Q(x').
,~. ~y E I(x') : b'a E 1L7(x',y) [ea(x',y) ~ Pa(x') (1 fja(x')].
Thus a state x' is an eyuilibrium if and only if:
1. it is attainable given the actions x'.
2. there does not exist a state, y, such that the change from state x' to state
y which is not unnoticed, and for every agent a E M(x',y) who is informed
about the change the state ea(x', y) which he anticipates to result is:
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(a) attainable from his piont of view.
(b) strictly preferred by him to the state x'.
Equilibrium in a social system with co-ordination is a generalization of the
Nash
equilibrium concept. In the case of a Nash equilibrium every player looks for im-
provements for himself, given the actions of the other players. One might
say that
in the case of Nash equilibrium players only co-ordinate their own
actions or, as
Vind (1983) puts it, the Nash equilibrium arises in the case of no co-ordination
in
the social system.
2.2 The Economy with Exchange Institutions
In Walras (1874) attention is paid to co-ordination, to institutions and the
relation
between the two of them. Walras writesl
"... for any phenomenon to be classified under the heading institutions
(. ..) it is necessary and sufficient that this phenomenon too originate in
the exercise of human will and, besides, that it consist of a relationship
between persons and persons designed for the mutual co-ordination of
destinies of the persons concerned."
So Walras understands institutions to be organization forms that help to
co-ordinate
the actions of persons. In the context of an exchange economy one might be in-
clined to think of markets as institutions. Furthermore considering the
core-like
equilibrium concepts one might consider coalitions as institutions. We
say more
about this in Section 4 of this paper.
In Vind (1983) an exchange economy in which exchange takes place
through
bilateral exchange institutions was introduced. These exchange institutions
do not
have relevant preferences of their own. The consumers are assumed to co-ordinate
the institutions they participate in, thus assuring these institutions seem
"to be
designed for the mutual co-ordination of the destinies of the persons concerned."
Therefore they seem to meet Walras' the description.
This leads to a model of an economy with two types of agents. The first type
are the coneumera. The second type of agents are the exchange in~titutione.
The
exchange institutions do not really have preferences which they
try to maximize.
1 Walras (1874), page 63.
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Their róle in the economy is to "supervise" the exchanges. In fact exchanges are as-
sumed not to take place directly between consumers but to be preformed indirectly
with the exchange institutions as intermediaries.
We assume the preferences of the consumers to be defined over the allocation
of goods over all consumers in the economy. We could, of course, have defined the
preferences such that they depend on the way in which the exchange institutions
are used, that is in such a way that it matters from whom you get the commodities.
This is the case if one likes to eat apples from Argentina but rejects to eat the same
type of apples if they come from Chile.
In defining the set of states attainable for consumer c, ~i~, we require that con-
sumer c participatee in the economy voluntarily. In our context voluntary partici-
pation is defined as to capture the notion of individual rationality.
Definition 2.3 A conaumer, c, with preference relation ~~ and initial endowment~
~~ E~t, participates voluntary án an economy E which yielda an allocation
x' E~~X~~ if and only if x' ~~ b~, wheret
6~ E mén{z E~it ~~ ~ z ie fea~ible in E and z~ - w~}
In assuming voluntary participation we exclude the case in which consumer c would
be sure to be better of by abstaining from all trading. Note that consumer c does not
take the voluntary participation of the other consumers into account in determining
the worst possible outcome if he would not participate in the economy. If there are
no external effects and there is only one exchange institution which consists of all
consumers, voluntary participation implies voluntary exchange.
In the economy with exchange institutions we denote the set of consumers by C,
whereas the set of exchange institutions is denoted by I. We denote an exchange
institution by the consumers who are allowed to trade through this institution.
We take as the set of institutions in our social system with co-ordination a subset
of 2~, the set of all subsets of the set C. We define exchange institutions such
that all participating agents are allowed to exchange all commodities through the
institutions. Of course one could define exchange institutions such that agents can
only exchange certain commodities through an exchange institution. One might
even define them in such a way that not every agent participating in an exchange
institution is allowed to exchange the same commodities through this institutions.
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After suitable changes in the definitions the results of Section 3 and Section 4 still
hold.
We define a co-ordination system, as described by the functions {ea}QECUi, such
that on the one hand the exchange institutions co-ordinate the exchanges taking
place through them and on the other hand consumers co-ordinate the exchanges
through the exchange institutions they are part of. We use (x-;; y;) to denote the
vector x with x; replaced by y;.
Definition 2.4 Let C be a aet of conaumera with preference relationa ~~ which are
complete preorderinga over ~2~"~c, where 1 denotea the number of commoditiea, and
intitial endowments w~ E Ji~. Let I 6e a auó~et of 2c. Then an Economy with
Exchange Institutions E-({~~,w~}~EC,I) ia defined to be the eocial ayatem
with co-ordination I' -(Y, {,Qa, Pa, ea}QECu1), where:
int Y~{y : C x I -~ ~21 ~ b c E i E I: -~~EC w~ C y(c, ti) ~~~EC w~}.
For every exchange institution i E I:
Qt(x) - Íj: -{y E Y I~~Et y(c, i) - 0}.
Y;(x) - Y `{x}.
e:(x,y) - (x-~;y:)-
For every conaumer c E C:
Qc(x) - h~~ -{y E Y ~(wd f~.i3dyld~t))dEC Tc bc
and ~i3cy(c,i) ? -w{}
where 6~ E min~ ~{z E~i} ~c ~ ~ y E f1.F~A: auch that `di E I: y(i, c) - 0
and bd E C~` {c} : zd - ~,~d y(i, d) f we}.
P~(x) -{y E Y ~w~ f~~3~y(c~z) r~ w~ f~.~~x(c,i)}.
e~(x,y) - ( x~~~;y.3~).
We define equilibrium in an economy with exchange institutions to be an equilib-
rium in the social system with co-ordination it can be represented by. Because of
the special characteristics of an economy with exchange institutions it follows that
for every y~ x it holds that M(x,y) : - {a E A ~ ea(x,y) ~ x} ~ 0. This leads to
the following equivalent formalization of equilibrium.
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Deflnition 2.5 Let E-({r~,w~}~E~,I) 6e an economy with exchange institutions
and let x E Y. Define
P(x) :- {y E Y ~ da E M(x,y) : ea(x,y) E Pa(x)}.
Ci(x) :- {y E Y ~~d a E M(x, y) : ea(x, y) E Qa}.
A system of net-trades y' is called an equilibrium in an economy with exchange
institutíons E if:
1. y' E Q(y~).
~. P(y') n B(y') - ~.
The first equilibrium condition in the above formulation states that an equilibrium
net-trade system must be attainable. It is a statement about the actual equilibrium
state. The second equilibrium condition is about antàcipated states. The set P(x)
is the set of net-trades that, for a given x, are anticipated to result in
net-trades
preferred to x by every agent that anticipates a change in net-trades. The set 8(x)
is the set of net-trades that, for a given x, are anticipated to result in a
attainable
state by those agents that anticipate a change in net-trades. Condition 2 states
that no net-trade exists that by every agent that anticipates a state different from
y', is anticipated to result in a state that is both preferred to y' and to be atainable
from y' .
In the proof of the theorems on equilibria in economies with exchange insti-
tutions we use the equivalent formulation of equilibrium in a social system with
co-ordination. This formulation is less suited for the purpose of exposition but
easier to work with in the proofs.
Given the exchange institutions of an economy E-({r~,w~}~E~,I) one might
wonder if it is possible for every consumer in the economy to exchange any commod-
ity with any other consumer in the economy. If this is possible we call an economy
with exchange institutions connected. Formally
Deflnition 2.6 .9n economy with exchange institutions E-({r~,w~}~E~,I) is said
to be connected if for each two consumers a, b E C there exists a sequence
of
institutions il, ..., ik E I such that a E il and 6 E ik and for every j E{1, ..., k- 1}
it holds that i~ fl ij}1 ~ m.
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3 The Existence Theorem
In this section we state our amended version of the theorem on the existence of
equilibrium in social systems with co-ordination. The theorem is based on the exis-
tence theorem of Keiding (1985, Theorem 2) in which an assumption oí convexity is
not mentioned. We show that the existence theorem for equilibrium in Vind (1983,
Theorem 3), which Keiding claims to extend, is incorrect. Vind's assumptions are
not sufficient for his assertion. Therefore the proof of the equilibrium existence the-
orem for an economy with bilateral exchanges, Vind (1985, Theorem 5), is invalid.
Our method of proof of the theorem on the existence of equilibrium in an economy
with exchange institutions can be used to give a correct proof of Theorem 5 oí
Vind (1983).
Theorem 3.1 Let (X, {,Qa, Pa, ea}QEA) be a eocial ay~tem with co-ordinatáon ~uch
that:
1. X i~ a non-empty, convex, compact eub~et of ~il.
2. ~3 : X~ X ia continuoue with cloeed, convex, non-empty value~.
y. tí a E A Pa : X~ X ha~ an open graph and for each x E X it holde that
x~ int Pa(x). Furthermore Pa ha~ convex (poaaibly emptyJ valuea.
4. d a E A eo :.Y x~1 -~ ~t ia continuou~, and for each x E .Y, ea(x, y)
ia
a,~ne in y and ea(x,x) - x.
5. daE A, f1x,y E X [ea(x,y) E Qa(x) ~ y E Qa(x)~~
6. b'x E X ~i(x) C intX.
Thcn th~rc exiete an equilibrium in thia .~orial .~yetem. with ~o-ordination.
Instead of Assumption 3 the existence theurem oí Vind (1983, Theorem 3) assutnes
Pá, which has the complements of the values of Pa as its values, and Pa, which
has the closures of the values of Pa as its values, to be continuous correspondences.
Furthermore Pa is assumed to have convex values and for every .c ~.Y the set Pa(x)
is assumed to be open in .Y. Finally, it is assumed that for every x E X it holds that
x E Pa(x). This existence theorem of Vind (1983) is not correct, a counterexample
is
given by I' :- (X, (,0a, Pa, eo)aEA) with A:- {1}, X :- [-1, 2l, Q1 :- [~~ 11, Pl(x) :-
X `{x},el(x,y) :- y.
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It seems difficult to give an example which shows Assumption 6 of the theorem
to be necessary. The example to illustrate the necessity of the assumption in Kei-
ding (1985) has several errors. Firstly Assumption 5 of the theorem does not hold
for the example. Secondly the example has a continuum of equilibria instead
of
none. Attempts by the author to construct an example which shows Assumption 6
to be necessary failed.
The proof of this existence theorem is essentially the proof of Keiding (1985).
In the existence theorem of Keíding the convexvaluedness of ~3 was not required.
The structure of the proof is a well known structure in proofs of existence of equi-
libria. First a correspondence is defined which satisfies the conditions oí a
fixed
point theorem. In this case the fixed point theorem will be that of Eilenberg and
Montgomery. Then the existence of a fixed point is proved. Finally it is proved that
the fixed point of the correspondence is an equilibrium and therefore an equilibrium
exists.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Step 1. Definition and propertíea of ~o.
Let A :- {1, . . . , n}. Define
S:-{pE~2~~~p~C1},
where ~. ~ denotes the Euclidean norm. Define f: X x X x Sn -~ ~i such
that
[n~
f(xiyiplr... ~iln) - [rPa' ea(xiy)'
a-1
Because of Assumption 4 the function f is continuous. Furthermore by Assumption
4 it holds that f( x, ., pl ,..., p„) is affine.
Define ~o : X x S" ~ X,
~Olxfplf...,pn) - ly E Q(x) ~ J(x~~~pl~...,pn) -
f(x,y,p1,...,Pn) for all y E p(x)}.
By the maximum theorem [see e.g. Hildenbrand (1974, p. 29)f ~lo is upper
hemi-
continuous for every x E 11 and p E Sn. Since ~3(x) C.1' is bounded by Assumption
1 Qlo is compact valued.
Furthermore ~o has convex values since f(x, -, pl, ... ,pn) ís affine and ,Q(x) is convex
by Assumption 2. Also, since dx E X: ,Q(x) ~ 0, it follows that
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dx E X, dp E.Sn :~0(x,Pl,...,pn) ~ 0.
Step 2. Definition and properties of ~n.
(a) Definítion of ~a, and a proof that ~a has nonempty values.
F'or a E{1, ..., n} define the correspondence ~a : X x Sn -~~ S by:
~a(x,Pl,...,p,i) :- (1)
{{pa E S II Pa ~- 1, H x E Pa(x) Pa ~ x
1 pa . x, } if Pa(x) ~ 0.
S if Pa(x) - 0.
Since x ~ Pa(x) by Assumption 3 then, if Pa(x) ~~, by with the separation
theorem for convex sets,
~paES: ~IPa~- land~lx E Pa(x): Pa.x ~ pa.x] (2)
and therefore
~paES: ~~Pa~- landdx E Pa(x)~ Pa-~ 1 pQ-x]
so all the values of ~a are nonempty.
(6~ A proof that ~a ie upper heTni-contánuous and co~npact valued.
For ~a(x, pl, ..., pn) C S it holds that ~a(x, pl, ..., pn) is bounded. Next we prove
that ~a is closed correspondence, and from this it follows that Qia is u.h.c., because
S is compact.
By definition, correspondence, ~Y, is closed at a point, xo, if and only if
[ x9 -. xo, y9 E~Y(xQ), y4 -' y] ~~ y E~(x0) ]
If Pa(x) - 0, then, trivially, ~a is closed in (x, pa, ..., pn).
Assume that Pa(x) ~ 0.
Take any sequence
-~ x(xv,P1,...,Pn)~1 ( ,Pl,...,p,~ .
0 Wlth v ~ 0and anY P: E~t(xv,Pi,...,Pn), and anY Pa E S (Pa)v-1 ~ Pa~
Clearly, ~ pá ~- 1. Suppose that pá ~~a(x, pl, ..., Pn). Then
~x E Pa(x) -Pa-x C pá.x.
11
Since Pa(x) has an open graph it follows from Assumption 3 that for v sufficiently
large:
pá . x G pá . xv with x E Pa(xv),
because ( pv )~ converges to pá and xu ~ x.n v-1
But this contradicts (1).
0 nSo pQ E~a(x, pr, ..., pn) and ~a is closed at every ( x, pl ,..., pn) E X
x S , so ~Q rs
u.h.c. on X x Sn.
~c~ ~a(x,pr,...,pn) ie contractible to a point.
We shall show that ~a(x, pr, ..., pn) is homeomorphic to a
convex set. Because of
the compactness of ~a(x, pr, ..., pn) this implies contractibility of ~,(x,
pl, ..., pn)
to a point.
If Pa(x) - 0 , then tpa(x, pi, ..., pn) - S which is convex.
Suppose Pa(x) ~~1. Next we prove that Pa(x) (1 rint X~~.
If Pa(x) fl rint X - 0 then every point, y, of PQ(x) is a limit-point
of X` Pa(x)
(since rintX - X). Since Pa(x) ~~, it follows that X`P,(x) is
not closed, so Pa(x)
is not open, which contradicts Assumption 3.
So choose x E Pa(x) ~1 rint X and consider the set
Q(x) :- {q E ~i I q. x- 1, 4' x C 4 ' x, for all x E Pa(x)}
-{9 E~~ I 9 ' x - 1~ 9' x C 9' x, for all x E Pa(x)}.
This set clearly is convex.
Now the map h:~i~ `{0} --r S such that
Inl
is a homeomorphism from the set Q(x), which is convex, to ~a(x, p~
,..., pn), so
~a(x, pl, ..., pn) is homeomorphic tu a convex set.
Step 3. The fixed-poánt-theorem of Eilenberg and Montgomery.
Define~:XxSn~~YxS"by
~lxfpl,...,pn) '- {(x,p,...,i7n) E~
X Sn I x E~0(x,pl,...,pn)
and Há E {1,...,n} : p - ~a(x,P1,...,Pn)}'
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Since ~ is the product of ~o and ~a, a E A, it is upper hemi-continuous with non-
empty, compact values which are contractible to a point.
By the fixed-point-theorem of Eilenberg aud Montgomery [see Border (1985, p. 73)J,
( 0 T~
3lx ,pl,...,iln) E X X
(xO,pl,...,pn) E ~(x0,pl,...,pn)'
Step 4. The fixed-point is an equilibriu~n.
5ince xo E~o(xo, Pi, ''', pn) it holds that xo E~?(xo ) and
yy E ,p(xo) : .f(xo,xo,pl,...,pn) J llxa,y,pl,...,pn)' (3)
Suppose xo is not an equilibrium.
Then ~ y E X: ~ M C A, M~ 0 such that:
ea(xo, y) E Pa(x) fl ~ía(xo) if a E M. (4)
and
ea(xo,y) - xo (E Qa(xo)) if a~ M. (5)
Now by Assumption 5 it follows that y E Q(xo). Furthermore:
d a E M: P;(xo) ~ 0.
Since pá E~a(xo, po, ..., pn) it follows that
d a E M: pá ' ea(xo, y) ~ Pa ' xo
by (1) and (4).
By Assumption 6 of the theorem, (4) and (5), it follows that for all a E
Rl:
ea(xo, y) E rint .l'.
It holds that for all a E 1~1(xo,y) that ea(xo,y) E Pa(xo) C Pa(xo).
Furthermore by
Assumption 3 it holds that Pa(xo) is convex. It follows from (2), (4) and (5)
that
pá . ea(xo, y) ~ pá ' xo for every a E A.




pá . ea(xo, y) ) pá , xo for every a E M(xo, y).
As a consequence, since M(xo,y) ~ 0,









0 0 0 0)
- f(x ,x ,pl,...,pn
This contradicts Formula ( 3) So it follows that the fixed-point xo is an equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Now the theorem for existence of equilibrium in an economy with
exchange in-
stitutions is proven.
Theorem 3.2 Let E -({r~,w~}~EC,I) be an economy with exchange inatitutiona
~uch that for every conaumer c his preferences r ~ are continuoua and convex. Then
an equilibrium in E exiats.
Proof
The equilibria in the social system with co-ordination I' - (Y, (~3a, Pa, ea)aECu~),
which is the economy with exchange institutions E, correspond to the equilibria in
the social system with co-ordination I' -(Y, ( ,0~, P~, e~)~EC) where Jj~ -,0~ f1i3~ p;.
Restrict the economy with exchange institutions E without loss of generalization
to the set Y C Y such that
Y~{y : C x I~~2i ~ dc E i E I: -~ w~ ~ y(c, i) c~ w~},
Ft~ ~Fc
and }' is convex and compact. Such a}' exists. Assumptions 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6
of
Theorem 3.1. are easily checked to hold for the social system with co-ordination
r-(y, (iQ~, p~, e~)~EC). Equilibria in I' correspond to equilibria in E restricted
to
Y and vice versa.
Assumption 3 remains to be checked. The convexity of the values of P~ follows
directly from the convexity of ~~ for the agents c E C. The irreflexivity of P~ follows
from its definition and implies x ~ int P~(x). The preferences of every consumer c
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are such that they can be represented by a continuous utility function. Further-
more the preference relation has no "thick" indifference classes except possibly
for
the class of satiation points.2 So for the restriction of P~ to the set of net-trades
excluding the satiation points the graph of P~ is open. Furthermore, because of
the
continuity of the preferences the set of satiation points is closed, and,
therefore, its
complement in the set of net-trades is open. The correspondence P~ is, by defini-




4 The Comparison with Some Allocation Mech-
anisms
In this section we compare equilibrium in an economy with co-ordination with
three
allocation mechanisms. We examine whether these allocation mechanisms can be
supported by exchange institutions.
We restrict ourselves to individualistic preference relations that, for every con-
sumer, c, can be represented by a continuous, quasi-concave and strictly monotonous
utility function, u~. We will denote a system of such preference relations by the
corresponding utility functions {v,~}~EC. We define E:- {u~,w~}~EC to be a pure
exchange economy.
In the first subsection we will show that in a connected economy with
co-
ordination the allocation resulting from an equilibrium net trade system is Pareto
efficient and individually rational in the pure exchange econom,y É consisting of the
consumers of the economy with exchange institutions. Furthermore every Pareto
eíficient allocation that is individual rational given initial endowments {w~}~EC can
be supported by a net trade system in any connected economy with exchange in-
stitutions.
In the second subsection we look at the core and find that coalitions, in
this
context, can be interpreted as exchange institutions. Every core allocation can
be
supported by an equilibrium in the economy with exchange institutions in which
'See Debreu (1959~ sections 4.6. and 4.7.
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the set of exchange institutions is the set of nonempty coalitions.
Furthermore we show that the Walrasian market is supported by an exchange
institution. Every Walrasian equilibrium is supported by an equilibrium in an
economy with exchange institutions with the set of consumers C as the exchange
institution to represent the Walrasian market.
Finally we show that not every market can be supported by an exchange insti-
tution. There may exist equilibria in a monopolistic market that are not supported
by some equilibrium in the economy with exchange institutions.
4.1 Pareto Efficiency
In this subsection we prove that for preferences as described above the set of equilib-
ria in a connected economy with exchange institutions supports and only supports
the set of Pareto efficient allocations that are individually rational in E. This will
make it easier for us to make the comparisons of the next subsection because
re-
sults on the Pareto efficency of the allocation mechanisms we compare with are well
known.
Theorem 4.1 Let E- ({u~,w~}~EC,I) be a connected economy with exchange in-
etitutione wáth utility functiona ae defzned above. Then an allocation x' ie weakly
Pareto e„~icient and individually rational in É:- {u~,w~}~EC if and only if there ex-
i~ta a net-tra.de ay9tem y' that ie an equilibrium in E euch that x~ -~i3~ y'(c, i) -~ w~
for all coneume.ra c E C.
Proof
If
Suppose y' is an equilibrium in E and x~ - r,~~ y'(c,i) ~- w~.
a' is individual rational for every cunsumer c because y' is an equilibrium and the
cli~linitiun uf ~i~.
Suppose x' is not Pareto efficient. Let x be individually rational for every consumer
c E C and let x be Pareto prefered to x'. Define
11~Ic -{c F C ~ u~(á„) 7 u~(x~)}.




Connectedness of E implies that every two consumers a and 6 from the set j can
exchange every commodity through the exchange institutions of MI.
By the continuity, the quasi-concavity and the strict monotonicity of the utility
functions of the consumers of E it follows, using the mean value theorem, that there
exists a allocation x such that:
1. ~cEMc xc C ~cEMc xc.
2. for every c E Mc it holds that u~(~~) ) u~(x~).
If ( j` Mc ) - 0, then define
~-~ x~ if c E Mc.
x` ' x~ if c~ Mc.
If ( j` Mc ) ~ 0, then define
t :- ~ (x~ - x~) ~ 0
cEMc
and
~~ if c E Mc.
' ' if c E C` j.x~ :- x~
x~~mt if cEj`Mc.




and since every pair of consumers form j can exchange every commodity with each
other through the exchange institutions of 11I~ it follows that there exists a y such
that for every c E j:
~y(c~t) ~ W~ - x~
t3~
and
~ y(c,i) - 0.
cEi
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Therefore y E ,C~ - ,0(y').
For every c E j it holds that e~(y',y) ~ y' and that e~(y',y) E P~(y') since
u~(x~) 1 uc(x~). Furthermore it holds that e~(y',y) E Q~ since ~~ 1 0.
Now every i E Mr it holds by definition that e;(y',y) ~ y' and ei(y',y) E P;(y').
Since ~ y(c, i) - 0 it holds that y E Qi.
Therefore y is such that Condition 2 for equilibrium in a social system
with co-




Let x' be an allocation that is Pareto efficient and individual rational for
every
consumer.
Because of the connectedness of E there e~cists a y' such that
~y~(c~z) - x~ -W`
i3c
and
~ y'(c,i) - 0.
cEi
Furthermore it holds that x~ ~ 0 because x' is feasible. It also holds that
~ x~ - ~ ~~'
cEC cEC
Therefore y' E l~iEi Qi and y' E UcEC Q~ by the definition of ~3~ and the
individual
rationality of x~. So Condition 1 for y' to be an equilibrium in I' is satisfied.
Suppose y' is not an equilibrium in I', i.e.
~y E P(y') n~(y~).
'I'his implies y ~ y'. Define
Mc -- M(y,y~) n C.
Mr .- M(y,y') ~i I.
Now define x~ :- ~i3ey(c,Z) -~ wc. For every c E Mc it holds that u~(x~) ) u~(x~)
and for c~ Mc it holds that u~(x~) - u~(x~).
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Furthermore it follows that x is attainable because for every a E A it holds that
ea(y',y) E,Qa(y), since y E Li(y'). But this implies x is weakly Pareto preferred to
x' which gives a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
4.2 The Allocation Mechanisms
In this subsection we examine whether coalitions in the contect of the core, the
Walrasian market and a monopoly market can be supported by exchange institu-
tions. Answering these questions is relatively easy since we can make use oí the
equivalence result of the foregoing subsection.
4.2.1 The Core
The first allocation mechanism we compare with the concept of equilibrium in an
economy with exchange institutions is the core. We define the core as follows
Deflnition 4.2 The core of the economy E, denoted by C(E), is the aet of x E X
with ~~EC x~ -~~EC w~, auch that there does not exiat a set F C C such that for
some x E X and for all c E F it hold that:
1. u~(x~) ~ u~(x~).
~. ~eEF xc ~ ~eEF wc'
Define Ec -({u~,w~}~EC,Ic) with the consumers of this economy with exchange
institutions as in E and with 1:- 'lc `{0}. IVow the following result holds.
Property 4.3 Let x' E C(E). Then there exists a y' E Y which is an equilibrium
in E~ -({uc,wc}cEC,Ic) such that x~ -~i3cy'(c,i) f wc.
Proof
From the definition of the core it follows immediatly that every core allocatiun is
both Pareto efficient and individually rational. Furthermore Ec is connected and
therefore Theorem 4.1. can be applied.
Q.E.D.
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So we find that a core allocation is supported by an equilibrium in the economy
that has the coalitions as exchange institutions. Therefore coalitions can be inter-
preted as some special kind of exchange institutions for consumers with preferences
as specified at the beginning of this section.
4.2.2 The Walrasian Market
Next we consider the Walrasian market in the economy E. We denote the set
of Walrasian allocations by W(E). We interpreted a Walrasian equilibrium as
stemming from an economy with only one market at which all commodities are
traded. As corresponding economy with exchange institutions we therefore take
Ety - ({u~,ui~}~EC,Iw) where Iiy :- {C}.
Property 4.4 Let x' E W(E), i.e. x' is a Walraaian equilibriurn. allocatáon. Then
there exiata a y' E Y which is an equiltibrium in Eyy - ({u~,w~}~EC,Iw) auch that
x~ - y~(c, C) ~ ca~.
Proof
The allocation x' is Pareto efficient by the first theorem for welfare economics.
Because there is voluntary exchange x' is individual rational for every consumer.
Finally E~y is connected and therefore application of Theorem 4.1. completes the
proof.
Q.E.D.
So the Walrasian market supported by some exchange institution, given the con-
ditions we imposed on the preferences of the consumers in the beginning of this
section.
4.2.3 The Monopoly Market
Not every market form can be supported by some kind of exchange institution.
To show this we consider an economy consisting oí two consumers, a and 6 and
two commodities, in which consumer a is the monopolist and consumer b the fol-
lower. The example shows us that in this economy the equilibrium does not cor-
respond to an equilibrium in the economy with exchange institutions in which the
exchange institution is a monopolistic market, viz. EM -({u~,w~}~EC,I~y) with
20
a
Figure 1: Monopoly pricing
h1 :- {{a,b}} -{C}. Clearly EM is connected. As the well known example
de~iicted in the 1?dgeworth be~x in I~'igure I ilh~strates, the nicinupcily equilibriurn
allocation x' need not be Pareto efí'icient and therefore, using Theorem 4.1., it may
be the case that no equilibrium y' in EM exists such that x~ - y'(c,{a,6}) ~ w~.
This shows that not all markets can be supportede by exchange institutions. As
noted in Vind ( 1990) a monopolistic market can be represented by a social sys-
tem with co-ordination in which the monopolist has the net-demand function of




The aim of this comment was twofold. Firstly we wanted to show that the existence
theorems for equilibrium in social systems with co-ordination oí Vind (1983) and
Keiding (1985) have to be amended. Secondly we wanted to analyse to what extend
exchange institutions support a number of allocation mechanisms.
In Section 2 an economy with exchange institutions has been defined as a special
type of social system with co-ordination in which we distinguish between consumers
and exchange institutions. The concept of voluntary participation in an economy
is introduced.
In Section 3 we have stated our amended version of the existence theorem for
equilibrium in a social system with co-ordination. We have used this theorem to
prove the existence of equilibrium in an economy with exchange institutions.
In Section 4 we assumed preferences to be individualistic and strictly monotonous.
We stated that under this additional assumption that equilibria in a connected
economy with exchange institutions support and only support allocations which
are both individually rational and Pareto efiicient. We used this equivalence result
to compare equilibrium in an economy with exchange institutions with the alloca-
tion mechanisms of the core, Walrasian equilibrium and monopoly. We found that
the monopolistic market is not supported by an exchange institution.
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